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A Call for State Legislators to Reconsider Their Stance
on School Choice and School Funding
I NTRODUCTION
The confluence of two major events in 2020 led to the need for state
legislators to reevaluate the stance their states have previously taken on
school choice and the public funding of private religious education. The
first event is the COVID-19 pandemic that has killed millions and left
others in a state of uncertainty. One significant consequence of the
pandemic that should concern state legislators is its effect on education. In
the pandemic, educators and schools were faced with extremely difficult
questions with seemingly impossible answers.1 Notably, the impact was
not limited to public schools. In fact, private schools, particularly private
religious schools, were greatly hurt by the COVID-19 pandemic.2 Many
schools closed because of the economic toll that took place as a result of a
decline in donations and enrollment.3 In a joint statement, many highranking Catholic officials expressed that “[b]ecause of economic loss and
uncertainty, many families are confronting the wrenching decision to pull
their children out of Catholic schools.”4 This effect on religious education
is a cause of concern for many,5 but the pandemic’s impact on religious

1. For an idea of some of the ways that schools, educators, and parents have been impacted
by the pandemic see, for example, Youki Terada, Covid-19’s Impact on Students’ Academic and
Mental Well-Being, EDUTOPIA (June 23, 2020), https://www.edutopia.org/article/covid-19s-impactstudents-academic-and-mental-well-being; Michelle Fox, Coronavirus has Upended School Plans. It
Will Also Worsen Racial and Economic Inequalities, Experts Warn, CNBC (Aug. 12, 2020, 12:28
PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/08/12/impact-of-covid-19-on-schools-will-worsen-racial-inequityexperts-say.html; Mark Hansen, 33 Questions Every School Should Answer as You Prepare to Reopen,
FRONTLINE EDUCATION (Jun. 23, 2020), https://www.frontlineeducation.com/blog/33-questionsschools-answer-before-reopening/.
2. Jeanne Allen, Why Saving Catholic Schools from Covid’s Impact is a National Imperative,
FORBES (Jul. 31, 2020, 5:27 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeanneallen/2020/07/31/why-savingcatholic-schools-from-covids-impact-is-a-national-imperative/?sh=3fc2ba8f2d83.
3. CATO
Institute,
COVID-19
Permanent
Private
School
Closures,
https://www.cato.org/covid-19-permanent-private-closures (last updated July 2021).
4. David Crary, Amid Pandemic, Future of Many Catholic Schools is in Doubt, ABC NEWS
(Aug. 9, 2020, 11:21 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/amid-pandemic-future-catholicschools-doubt-72266550.
5. See, e.g., Giulia McDonnell Neito del Rio, A Growing Number of Catholic Schools are
Shutting Down Forever, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/05/us/
catholic-school-closings.html; Ray Domanico & Nora Kenney, Revivifying Catholic Education in the
Era of School Choice, UNIV. NOTRE DAME CHURCH LIFE J. (Aug. 19, 2020),
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private schools should also concern state legislators because of the value
these schools provide to students in their states.
The second event is the 2020 Supreme Court decision Espinoza v.
Montana Department of Revenue.6 This decision impacts the previous
legal and constitutional arguments that have been cited in the past to
oppose school choice and religious school funding. The case centered on
a Montana scholarship program that aimed “to provide parental and
student choice in education.”7 After the program was in place, the Montana
Department of Revenue, citing the No-Aid provision in the state
Constitution,8 determined that the scholarship program could not be used
to help students attending religious schools.9 This decision forced parents
hoping to send their children to Christian schools to sue because they felt
discriminated against because of their religion.10 The case went to the
Supreme Court where the Court, in a 5-4 decision,11 determined that “[a]
State need not subsidize private education. But once a State decides to do
so, it cannot disqualify some private schools solely because they are
religious.”12
This landmark decision changed the legal and constitutional
understanding of school choice and public funding of religious schools.
Therefore, previous legal arguments against school choice are no longer
persuasive nor applicable, giving state legislators the power to change the
educational landscape, in a time when a change could help save many of
the struggling private religious schools because of the COVID-19
pandemic. As a result, state legislators should now reevaluate their
understanding of school choice and school funding and work to implement
different school funding programs in their state.
Part I begins by examining the idea of school choice and why state
legislators need to understand it. In Part II, the constitutional concerns and
legal history of school choice are given, including the development of state
Blaine Amendments and the key cases that have shaped the legal
https://churchlifejournal.nd.edu/articles/revivifying-catholic-education-in-the-era-of-schoolchoice/?fbclid=IwAR3iXewTdujk0lzC-daPdvGaMlxwjuA5qULqBIReUyo8fqlMTquZ933yg2I.
6. Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020).
7. Id. at 2251 (quoting 2015 Mont. Laws p. 2168, § 7).
8. See MONT. CONST., art. X, § 6(1).
9. Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2252.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 2246. This case was even more divided than the 5-4 split made it seem. Seven
different opinions were written for this case: the opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts; three
concurring opinions written by Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, and Alito; and three dissenting opinions
written by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor.
12. Id. at 2261.
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considerations for school choice and made the previous legal and
constitutional arguments against school choice pretextual. Part III
discusses how states used Blaine Amendments before the Espinoza
decision and what is left of them post-Espinoza. Next, Part IV outlines
what educational choice programs have been implemented in different
states, how they work, and why they are good options for state legislators
to consider. While this Comment focuses on the legal arguments behind
school choice and school choice programs, Part V notes, but does not
argue for in full, some of the social benefits school choice programs give
to students, schools, and communities. And, finally, Part VI explains why
state legislators should consider the various school choice programs and
implement them in their states now that the legal arguments against them
are no longer persuasive.

I. W HAT IS S CHOOL C HOICE ?
Typically, when a child reaches school age, the decision of what
school to attend has already been made for that child—they must go to
their geographically assigned public school.13 No other consideration is
given in the decision. School choice advocates, however, seek a better way
to make that decision. They explain that “[e]ducational choice is based on
the idea that parents [should be] in control of where their child goes to
school.”14 Because a parent and a student understand the individual needs
of that student best, they deserve the right to find and attend the school
that best caters towards that student’s needs.
Those who promote school choice also seek ways for the government
to subsidize the cost of the other school choice options, specifically private
schools. Tax-credit options, voucher programs, or scholarship
opportunities are ways that states legislators have provided those funds to
families in the past. But critics of school choice argue against these
government subsidies for many reasons.15 What is most at issue in this
13. Jonathan D. Boyer, Education Tax Credits: School Choice Initiatives Capable of
Surmounting Blaine Amendments, 43 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 117, 119 (2009).
14. AJ Willingham, How to Make Sense of the School Choice Debate, CNN (May 24, 2007,
2:41 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/05/24/us/school-choice-debate-betsy-devos/index.html.
15. These criticisms include the claims that school choice programs will take money away
from the public-school system, that the programs will limit diversity within schools, and that parents
should not or cannot make the best choice for their children. See, e.g., Bayliss Fiddiman & Jessica
Yin, The Danger Private School Voucher Programs Pose to Civil Rights, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS
(May 13, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/education-k-12/reports/2019/
05/13/469610/danger-private-school-voucher-programs-pose-civil-rights/; Natalie Wexler, Six
Reasons Why School Choice Won’t Save Us, FORBES (Apr. 29, 2018, 3:20 PM),
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Comment is the criticism that, based on the Federal Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses and state Blaine Amendments, it is unconstitutional
for a state legislature to provide funding for religious schools.16 In order
to promote school choice, proponents and state legislatures must face legal
and constitutional questions concerning the funding of religious schools,
which is described in the next part.

II. L EGAL H ISTORY
The legal history and constitutionality of school choice and religious
school funding is long and ever-changing. The history, however, is
important to help state legislators to appreciate the significance of
Espinoza and the need for reconsideration of their understanding of the
issues.
A. Constitutional Concerns for School Choice
The story of the constitutionality of school choice and religious
funding begins with the twin religion clauses of the First Amendment of
the Federal Constitution. The Establishment Clause states that “Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion . . . .”17 The Free
Exercise Clause quickly follows: “Congress shall make no
law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of religion] . . . .”18 The
Establishment Clause, which applies to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment,19 is interpreted to mean that “the First Amendment forbids
an official purpose to disapprove of a particular religion or of religion in
general.”20 While the Free Exercise Clause, which also applies to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment,21 “protect[s] religious observers
against unequal treatment” through “laws that target the religious for
‘special disabilities’ based on their ‘religious status.’”22 While these
https://www.forbes.com/sites/nataliewexler/2018/04/29/six-reasons-why-school-choice-wont-saveus/?sh=21af0e4f142e. Another major criticism is that these programs will have harmful effects on the
school system as a whole. See Boyer, supra note 13, at 120.
16. See discussion infra Section II.A.
17. U.S. CONST. amend. I, § 1.
18. Id.
19. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
20. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532 (1993).
21. See Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303.
22. Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2019 (2017)
(quoting Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., 508 U.S. at 533). Decades before this, the Supreme Court
had explained that because of the Free Exercise Clause a state “cannot hamper its citizens in the free
exercise of their own religion. Consequently, it cannot exclude individual Catholics, Lutherans,
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clauses seem straight-forward, an issue occurs when these two clauses
interact with each other.23 The Supreme Court described this by saying,
“there is ‘play in the joints’ between what the Establishment Clause
permits and the Free Exercise Clause compels.”24
The constitutional analysis also includes the Blaine Amendments in
many state constitutions. These state amendments came from a failed
amendment to the U.S. Constitution, proposed by Congressman James G.
Blaine in 1875.25 He proposed an amendment that forbade any “money
raised by taxation in any State for the support of public schools” to be used
by “any religious sect.”26 Blaine’s proposal was in response to the number
of Catholics who were immigrating into the country.27 Catholics worried
about the Protestant influence in the public school system and wanted to
teach their religion in separate schools, which led to the development of
the Catholic school system.28 Ultimately, this amendment failed to pass in
the Senate, despite passing in the House.29
Even though the amendment failed, many states enacted their own
version of the Blaine Amendment to their state’s constitution.30
Additionally, states who entered the Union during this time were generally
“required to implement a modified version of the Blaine amendment as a
condition of joining the Union.”31 Today, thirty-seven states have a Blaine
Amendment in their state constitution.32 And they are often used to stop
government programs that give funding to religious schools and their
students.33 The wording of these amendments, however, varies amongst
the states. Some states have strict restrictions—Michigan’s amendment,
Mohammedans, Baptists, Jews, Methodists, Non-believers, Presbyterians, or the members of any other
faith, because of their faith, or lack of it, from receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation.”
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (emphasis added).
23. See Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 668–69 (1970).
24. Trinity Lutheran Church, 137 S. Ct. at 2019 (quoting Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718
(2004)).
25. Boyer, supra note 13, at 130.
26. H.R.J. Res. 1, 44th Cong. Rec. 205 (1875).
27. See Edward J. Larson, The “Blaine Amendment” in State Constitutions, in THE SCHOOLCHOICE CONTROVERSY: WHAT IS CONSTITUTIONAL? 35, 38 (James W. Skillen ed., 1993).
28. See id. at 37; see also ROSEMARY C. SALOMONE, VISIONS OF SCHOOLING: CONSCIENCE,
COMMUNITY, AND COMMON EDUCATION 18–22 (2000) (describing the development of the Catholic
school system amidst strong prejudice against it throughout the development of the more Protestantfriendly public school system).
29. Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2269 (2020) (Alito, J., concurring).
30. Larson, supra note 27, at 40.
31. Id.
32. Boyer, supra note 13, at 131.
33. This is the premise of the Zelman and Espinoza cases, among others that are discussed
below. See discussion infra Sections II.C.1, II.C.4.
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for example, prohibits the state from “directly or indirectly” giving aid to
“any private, denominational or other nonpublic, pre-elementary,
elementary, or secondary school.”34 Other states’ amendments are more
flexible. For instance, South Carolina’s amendment only prohibits state
funds from being used “for the direct benefit of any religious or other
private educational institution.”35
Historically, to ensure the constitutionality of any funding program
that a state enacts, it must be consistent with the religious clauses of the
Federal Constitution and the Blaine Amendment in the state constitution,
if there is one.
B. Early Jurisprudence of State Aid to Religious Schools
The history of the jurisprudence on whether public funds can be
provided to religious schools or help students attending religious schools
has been a long and confusing road. The Supreme Court has dramatically
changed its understanding of the constitutional provisions through the
years. For example, in 1947, it wanted to maintain a separation between
church and state but still accommodate programs that were neutral and
general towards religion. In Everson v. Board of Education, the Court
answered whether a school board could subsidize school bus
transportation for children attending private religious schools.36 The Court
recognized that while there was a “high and impregnable” wall between
church and state, there are possible exceptions.37 And because the bus
program was “general” and “neutral in its relations with groups of
religious believers and non-believers” an exception could be made, and
the program was allowed.38 This early accommodationist interpretation
continued for a few years.39
In 1971, the Court changed course and established a stricter “wall of
separation” between church and state. In a case about whether a state can
34. MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 2. See also MICH. CONST. art. I, § 4. Massachusetts’s Constitution
is similarly strict in its wording, saying “No grant, appropriation or use of public money or property
or loan of credit shall be made or authorized by the commonwealth or any political subdivision thereof
for the purpose of founding, maintaining or aiding any . . . primary or secondary school . . . which is
not publicly owned and under the exclusive control, order and supervision of . . . the commonwealth.”
MASS. CONST. Amend. art. XVIII, § 2.
35. S.C. CONST. Ann. art. XI, § 4 (emphasis added).
36. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 3–4 (1947).
37. Id. at 18.
38. Id.
39. See Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (holding that a program which loaned
textbooks to students attending parochial schools was constitutional because it did not favor one
religion over another and the benefit went to the students, not the schools).
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provide salary help for teachers at religious schools that met certain
criteria,40 the Supreme Court established the now infamous “Lemon
Test.”41 The three-prong test says that for a program to not violate the
Establishment Clause the program must 1) “have a secular legislative
purpose,” 2) have a “principal or primary effect . . . that neither advances
nor inhibits religion,” and 3) “not foster ‘an excessive government
entanglement with religion.’”42 This test was used to block this and many
other programs, which resulted in a stricter separation between church and
state for many years.43
C. A Trend to Break Down the “Wall of Separation”
Eventually the Supreme Court began to return to its early
accommodationist ideals and permitted more programs that had both
neutrality and private choice aspects.44 This trend continued until the early
2000s when big strides were made in the fight for government funding and
school choice. A few major Supreme Court cases from this time are
explained below.

40. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 607–08 (1971).
41. The Lemon Test has faced a lot of criticism throughout the years, particularly because it
has been used inconsistently in the courts. For example, Justice Scalia said, “Like some ghoul in a
late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly
killed and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause jurisprudence once again . . . .” Lamb’s
Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
42. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13.
43. Id. at 625. Other cases where the Lemon Test was used include Tilton v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 672 (1971) (denying grants to church-related colleges and universities to build academic
buildings); Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (denying
programs that provided money for maintenance and repair of religious schools and tuition
reimbursement for low-income students attending nonpublic schools); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S.
349 (1975) (striking down a program that loaned equipment to religious schools because the
equipment could be used to further religious purposes); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985)
(invalidating a program that sent teachers into religious schools to provide instruction for students who
were falling behind).
44. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (allowing an education tax deduction program
because the deduction was based solely on the parent’s private choice); Witters v. Wash. Dep’t of
Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) (striking down a challenge to a scholarship program that
provided aid to a student studying at a religious institution because the money reached the school as a
result of the student’s private choice); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993)
(approving a program that provided sign-language interpreters for deaf children in religious schools
because the aid was going to the students, rather than the schools).
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1. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris
The first landmark case in support of school choice came in 2002 from
Ohio.45 This case addressed the Pilot Project Scholarship Program that was
enacted to help a failing Cleveland school district and to give “educational
choices to families with children who reside” in that district.46 The
program gave different types of aid to students, but at issue here was the
“tuition aid” it provided to students to attend “a participating public or
private school of their parent’s choosing.”47 The program was challenged
under the Establishment Clause,48 because “[a]ny private school, whether
religious or nonreligious, may participate in the program and accept
program students . . . .”49 And the majority of the private schools
participating in the program were religious private schools.50
The Court’s opinion emphasized both the neutrality and private choice
aspects of the program. While the Establishment Clause forbids laws that
have the “‘purpose’ or ‘effect’ of advancing or inhibiting religion,”51 the
program here “was enacted for the valid secular purpose of providing
educational assistance to poor children in a demonstrably failing public
school system.”52 And the program’s religious neutrality was “wholly as a
result of [a person’s] own genuine and independent private choice” of
where to go to school.53 Thus, any “incidental advancement of a religious
mission, or the perceived endorsement of a religious message” belongs to
“the individual recipient, not to the government, whose role ends with the
disbursement of benefits.”54 The Court held that because the program
provided “true private choice” to the families and was “neutral in all
respects toward religion,” it was constitutional.55
While the majority opinion recognized there might be other concerns,
such as whether the program gave the appearance of promoting religion or

45. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
46. Id. at 643–44.
47. Id. at 645.
48. Id. at 648. Ohio does not have a Blaine Amendment in its state constitution, so the Federal
Constitution was the only constitutional roadblock the program had to clear.
49. Id. at 645.
50. Id. at 647.
51. Id. at 648–49 (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 222–23 (1997).
52. Id. at 649.
53. Id. at 652. These decisions were based on the Supreme Court precedent of Mueller, Witters,
and Zobrest which had previously moved the Court away from the strict separationist ideology of
Lemon. See supra note 44.
54. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 652.
55. Id. at 653, 662–63.
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whether the majority of those who use the program are religious, the Court
decided those concerns do not matter.56 Ultimately, the question came
down to whether the program was “coercing parents into sending their
children to religious schools,” and that was not happening here. 57 There
was no financial incentive given to choose a religious school over another
type of school; in fact, it was the opposite.58
This case was a breakthrough for school choice proponents. But these
programs were slow to develop because this program did not have to
contend with a state Blaine Amendment, which would prove harder to do.
As such, more litigation was needed to give states a go-ahead in
implementing school choice programs.
2. Locke v. Davey
Two years after Zelman, another school funding and school choice
case reached the Supreme Court. In Locke v. Davey the state of
Washington began the Promise Scholarship Program that “assist[ed]
academically gifted students with postsecondary education expenses.”59 In
this program, graduating high school students that met “academic, income,
and enrollment requirements” could receive money for education expenses
for postsecondary education in Washington.60 This program’s issue was
that it barred students who wanted to “pursue a degree in theology” from
receiving money.61 This restriction was added because of the “State’s
constitutional prohibition” on providing funds to support religious
education or schools.62 A student hoping to “double major in pastoral
ministries and business management/administration” tried to use this
program but was denied access.63 He brought this case, claiming his Free
Exercise Constitutional Rights were violated.64 The case made it to the
Supreme Court, which struck down the student’s claim.

56. See generally id. at 654–63.
57. Id. at 655–56.
58. Id. at 654.
59. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 715 (2004); See also WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 150-80-010
to -100 (2003).
60. Locke, 540 U.S. at 716; See also WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 250-80-020(12) (2003).
61. Locke, 540 U.S. at 716; See also WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 250-80-020(12)(f) to (g) (2003).
62. Locke, 540 U.S. at 716; See WASH. CONST., art. I, § 11 (“No public money or property
shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or the support of
any religious establishment.”); WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 4 (“All schools maintained or supported
wholly or in part by the public funds shall be forever free from sectarian control or influence.”).
63. Locke, 540 U.S. at 717.
64. Id. at 717–18.
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The Court argued that, even though the Zelman precedent meant this
program did not break the Establishment Clause,65 “there [was] room for
play in the joints” because “some state actions permitted by the
Establishment Clause [are] not required by the Free Exercise Clause.”66
This case asked whether this program could, without violating the Free
Exercise Clause, use the Washington State Constitution’s Blaine
Amendment to deny a person the use of this program solely because that
person wanted to use it to pursue a degree in theology.67
The Court’s decision outlined the country’s history of not using public
money to fund the education of ministers, and Washington had used that
history to keep a separation between public funds and churches.68 It
acknowledged, however, that the program does not deny people the right
to participate in the “political affairs of the community” because of their
religion, nor does it force people to choose “between their religious beliefs
and receiving a government benefit.”69 Washington had simply decided
“not to fund a distinct category of instruction.”70 Ultimately, the Court
recognized that the program had pro-religion aspects, meaning it was not
hostile towards religion.71 And because the state Constitution’s history and
text is not hostile toward religion, the “denial of funding for vocational
religious instruction alone” is constitutional.72
The decision of Locke seemed at odds with the Court’s previous
decision in Zelman, as the Court took a step back in its willingness to
approve school choice and school funding programs. However, moving
forward, the Court distinguished many programs from Locke, and,
ultimately, the case has not stopped the progression of school choice
programs.
3. Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer
A 2017 Supreme Court case, Trinity Lutheran v. Comer, while not an
obvious school choice case, has foreseeable ramifications for the question
of school funding.73 The case focuses on a Missouri program that provided
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
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Id. at 719.
Id. at 718–19.
Id. at 719.
See id. at 722.
Id. at 720.
Id. at 721.
Id. at 724–25.
Id. at 725.
Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017).
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money to schools and daycare centers to “purchase rubber playground
surfaces made from recycled tires.”74 The program seemed neutral on its
face, but because of Missouri’s Blaine Amendment,75 the program “had a
strict and express policy of denying grants to any applicant owned or
controlled by a church, sect, or other religious entity.”76 When Trinity
Lutheran Church Child Learning Center was denied the money despite
being fifth in line to receive it, the church sued, claiming their
application’s denial violated their Free Exercise rights.77 The lower courts
denied these claims, finding that this case was “nearly indistinguishable
from Locke” because, while the program did not violate the Establishment
Clause, the Free Exercise Clause did not compel them to fund religious
entities, especially considering the state’s own constitution.78 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the lower court’s
decision.79
While this case falls into the joints between the twin clauses, the Court
decided that the Free Exercise Clause should control in cases like this.80
The Free Exercise Clause is violated when “a generally available benefit”
is denied “solely on account of religious identity.”81 The only exception is
a denial based only on “a state interest ‘of the highest order.’”82 The
programs that have been upheld, rejecting the Free Exercise challenges,
are “neutral and generally applicable without regard to religion,” and do
not “single out the religious for disfavored treatment.”83 A program may
not make a church, school, or person choose between either receiving the
public benefit or continuing their religious affiliation.84 If it does, then it
is denying that church, school, or person its constitutional right to exercise

74. Id. at 2017.
75. Id.; See MO. CONST. art. I, § 7 (“That no money shall ever be taken from the public treasury,
directly or indirectly, in aid of any church, sect, or denomination of religion, or in aid of any priest,
preacher, minister or teacher thereof. . .”); MO. CONST. art. IX, § 8 (“Neither the general assembly,
nor any county, city, town, township, school district or other municipal corporation, shall ever make
an appropriation or pay from any public fund whatever, . . . to help to support or sustain any private
or public school, academy, seminary, college, university, or other institution of learning controlled by
any religious creed, church or sectarian denomination whatever.”).
76. Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2017.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 2019, 2025.
80. Id. at 2019.
81. Id.
82. Id. (quoting McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 628 (1978)).
83. Id. at 2020.
84. Id. at 2021–22.
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its religion.85 The challenged program did just that and thus was
unconstitutional.86
Despite the similarities between the two cases, the Court distinguished
Trinity Lutheran from Locke for two reasons.87 First, there is a difference
between denying claims based on religious use, like the program in Locke
did, and denying claims based on religious status, like the program in
Trinity Lutheran did.88 The denial in Locke came because he wanted to use
the money to prepare for a job in the ministry, while the denial in Trinity
Lutheran was “simply because of what it [was]—a church.”89 Second, the
church in Trinity Lutheran was expressly forced between choosing the
public benefit or choosing their religion, but that choice was not required
in Locke, where a student could exercise religion and participate in the
program.90 The Trinity Lutheran program forced the school to make such
a choice and was a key reason why the program was held
unconstitutional.91
While this case appeared to be a big win for school funding and school
choice advocates, the majority opinion made it clear that this case and the
Court’s consideration only “involves express discrimination based on
religious identity with respect to playground resurfacing.”92 No other
religious uses of funding were considered. That would have to wait a few
years.
4. Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue
The latest development in the school choice and religious school
funding jurisprudence is Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue.93
The program at issue gave tax credits to those who donated money to a
scholarship program for students to use for private school tuition.94 The
program originally allowed money to be used for tuition at any school that
85. Id.
86. Id. at 2022.
87. Id. at 2023.
88. Id.; In a concurrence, Justice Gorsuch, with Justice Thomas joining, states that he has
“doubts about the stability of such a line” between “religious status and religious use.” Id. at 2025
(Gorsuch J., concurring). He further explains that the Free Exercise Clause “guarantees the free
exercise of religion, not just the right to inward belief (or status).” Id. at 2026 (Gorsuch J., concurring).
89. Id. at 2023.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 2023–24.
92. Id. at 2024 n.3.
93. 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020).
94. Id. at 2251.
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met certain standards, but the Montana Department of Revenue eventually
used the Montana Constitution to exclude any school “owned or controlled
in whole or in part by any church, religious sect, or denomination” from
being able to participate in the program.95 Three mothers whose children
attended a Christian private school brought a lawsuit after their children
were denied a scholarship.96 The suit made it to the Montana Supreme
Court, which held that the program could not be used to fund religious
schools and so invalidated the program altogether to ensure that no
discrimination took place.97 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The Court explained that this case was not based on the Establishment
Clause, but rather was a question of “whether excluding religious schools
and affected families from that program was consistent with the [Free
Exercise Clause.]”98 While the state tried to justify the discrimination with
the Blaine Amendment, the Court explained that, similar to the issue in
Trinity Lutheran, discrimination here is not permitted because it prevents
a person from receiving a public benefit solely because of religious
status.99 It forces a choice between following religious beliefs or receiving
a public benefit—it is impossible to have both.100
Again, the Court felt the need to distinguish this case from Locke.
First, the student in Locke was denied the scholarship because of how he
intended to use the money, but how the students intended to use the money
was not the basis for the discrimination in this case.101 The scholarship was
denied because of the school’s religious status.102 Second, unlike in Locke
where there was a “‘historic and substantial’ state interest in not funding
the training of clergy” that justified the denial of money, in Espinoza there
was no historical precedent for disallowing the funding of religious
schools.103 The Court rejected the argument that the proposed federal
Blaine Amendment and the large number of state Blaine Amendments
established a historical precedent to prohibit the funding today.104 This
95. Id. at 2252. Interestingly, after the Department of Revenue made this change, the Montana
Attorney General sent a letter to the department saying that the Montana Constitution did not require
this change, and making it would “very likely” discriminate against those seeking to attend religious
schools and violate the federal Constitution. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 2253.
98. Id. at 2254.
99. Id. at 2255.
100. Id. at 2256.
101. Id. at 2257.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 2257–58.
104. Id. at 2258–59.
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history is different because these amendments have a history of bigotry
towards the Catholic Church and are used to single out religious schools
in a discriminatory way.105
Ultimately, the Court decided that the scholarship program could not
be used to discriminate against those who seek to use the program to pay
for their attendance in religious private schools. “A State need not
subsidize private education. But once a State decides to do so, it cannot
disqualify some private schools solely because they are religious.”106 This
decision guaranteed that scholarship programs like this are constitutionally
approved.107

III. W HAT IS LEFT OF A S TATE ’ S B LAINE A MENDMENT ?
After Espinoza, one question remained: what power do the thirtyseven state Blaine Amendments now have?108 The answer to this question
is important for state legislators to understand because their work is greatly
impacted by the answer. Their need to reevaluate their understanding of
the legal and constitutional arguments of school choice is based on the
power their state Blaine Amendment has. As such, that question will be
discussed in this Part.
A. Blaine Amendments Before Espinoza
At the time of the Espinoza ruling in June 2020, thirty-seven states had
Blaine Amendments in their Constitutions.109 State legislators and courts
have interpreted their respective Blaine Amendments to either allow all,
some, or no types of school choice and school funding programs. This Part
will look at these different interpretations before explaining why state
legislators must reevaluate their previous stance because of the Espinoza
decision.

105. Id. at 2259. The Court’s decision, while not explicitly declaring the Blaine Amendments
unconstitutional or repealing them altogether, does severely limit the amount of power they have to
restrict government funding to private religious schools. See discussion infra Section III.B.
106. Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2261.
107. Id. at 2262–63.
108. Leslie Hiner, What the Espinoza Ruling Means for Blaine Amendments and School Choice,
EDCHOICE (July 22, 2020), https://www.edchoice.org/engage/what-the-espinoza-ruling-means-forblaine-amendments-and-school-choice/; Steven Green, Symposium: RIP state “Blaine
Amendments”—Espinoza and the “no-aid” Principle, SCOTUSBLOG (June 30, 2020, 3:47 PM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/06/symposium-rip-state-blaine-amendments-espinoza-and-the-noaid-principle/.
109. Boyer, supra note 13, at 131.
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1. An interpretation that is open to all types of school choice
programs
Multiple states have been open to all types of school funding
programs, despite their Blaine Amendment. For example, Illinois’s Blaine
Amendment says:
Neither the General Assembly nor any county, city, town, township,
school district, or other public corporation, shall ever make any
appropriation or pay from any public fund whatever, anything in aid of
any church or sectarian purpose, or to help support or sustain any school,
academy, seminary, college, university, or other literary or scientific
institution, controlled by any church or sectarian denomination
whatever . . .110
But Illinois state legislators have understood that public aid given to
schools by government programs is a benefit for the students themselves
rather than for the schools. For instance, when a state program provided
free transportation to all students, both at public and private schools, the
program’s constitutionality was challenged.111 The Supreme Court of
Illinois decided that even though a benefit might reach religious schools,
those benefits were “incidental.”112 The program “was enacted for the
secular purpose of protecting the health and safety of children traveling to
and from nonpublic schools” and that “neither advances nor inhibits
religion.”113 This ruling continued a pattern where Illinois courts respected
the decision of state legislators and allowed funding of religious schools
despite the Blaine Amendment.114 Before Espinoza, there were two
educational choice programs in Illinois despite the Blaine Amendment.115
2. An interpretation that is open to some, but not all, types of school
choice programs
In other states, state legislators have interpreted their Blaine
Amendment in a way that allowed some types of school choice programs,
110. ILL. CONST. art. X, § 3.
111. Board of Ed., School Dist. No 142 v. Bakalis, 299 N.E.2d 737, 739 (Ill. 1973).
112. Id. at 743.
113. Id.
114. See Cecrle v. Illinois Educational Facilities Authority, 288 N.E.2d 399 (Ill. 1972) (holding
that tax-exempt bonds could be made available to private religious institutions despite the state
constitution).
115. See Illinois’ Tax Credits for Educational Expenses is a Tax Credit Program for Educational
Expenses, 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/201(m); Illinois’ Invest in Kids Tax-Credit Scholarship Program, 35
ILL. COMP. STAT. 40 et. seq.
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but not all. Arizona, for example, has a Blaine Amendment that states: “No
tax shall be laid or appropriation of public money made in aid of any
church, or private or sectarian school, or any public service
corporation.”116 Arizona state legislators used this provision to allow some
types of educational choice programs. Since 1999, state legislators in
Arizona have created tax credit programs that provide a tax break to those
who donate money to scholarship organizations for students attending
private schools.117 One such program was challenged in an Arizona court
for violating both the Federal Establishment Clause and the Arizona
Constitution.118 But the court determined that while there are educational
provisions in the state Constitution, there was also a fundamental desire of
state legislators and others to bolster schools and students and no desire to
“divorce completely any hint of religion from all conceivably state-related
functions . . . .”119 And doing so is not “realistically attainable in today’s
world.”120 The program, the court decided, was neutral to religion and
provided no direct aid to schools, but gave tax breaks to people for their
individual choice. This meant that the program both promoted schools and
did not promote direct aid to religious schools—the goals of the
educational provisions of the Arizona Constitution.121
After tax credit programs were allowed, state legislators tried to
establish two voucher programs to give more school choice options.122
These programs were challenged, and the joined case made its way to the
Arizona Supreme Court. This time, however, these programs were held
unconstitutional because they were not aligned with the educational
provisions of the state constitution.123 The program’s proponents claimed
that, like the tax credit programs, the funds in the voucher programs were
not directly aiding schools, but the students were the “true beneficiary,”
making the programs permissible under the Blaine Amendment.124 The
court rejected this argument, however, saying that there is no difference
between giving money to parents and families who use the money to pay

116. ARIZ. CONST. art. IX. § 10; see also ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 12.
117. See Individual Tax Credit Scholarships, ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 43-1089 to 43-1089.02.
118. See Kotterman v. Killian, 972 P.2d 606 (Ariz. 1999).
119. Id. at 623.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 625.
122. Arizona Scholarships for Pupils with Disabilities Program, ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§15-891 to
15-891.06 (2008); Arizona Displaces Pupils Choice Grant Program, ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 15-817 to
§§ 15-817.07 (2008).
123. Cain v. Horne, 202 P.3d 1178, 1185 (Ariz. 2009).
124. Id. at 1183.
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the schools and giving money directly to the schools, which is “flatly
prohibit[ed].”125 The voucher programs were declared unconstitutional
and so are not allowed in Arizona.126
3. An interpretation that is not open to any types of school choice
programs
At the time of Espinoza many states, like Wyoming, Texas, and
California, had Blaine Amendments and no educational choice programs.
This is possibly because state legislators had not tried to enact school
funding programs, or they had tried and failed. Thus, there is little to no
jurisprudence that shows how the Blaine Amendment would have been
interpreted before Espinoza. But the lack of educational funding programs
altogether, however, could show that state legislators were not willing to
push against the state Blaine Amendment, meaning the Blaine
Amendment would be strictly interpreted to not allow any educational
choice programs.
In addition, Massachusetts and Michigan have explicitly interpreted
their Blaine Amendment strictly to not allow any educational choice
programs. Their Blaine Amendments forbid funding to schools that are not
publicly owned,127 meaning no private schools can receive public funds,
regardless of whether the schools are religious or not. Thus, no educational
funding programs have been implemented in these states, and that is likely
to be the case until the amendment is either changed or repealed.
4. States without Blaine Amendments
Thirteen states do not have Blaine Amendments in their constitutions,
making one fewer constitutional barriers state legislators would have to
cross when implementing a school funding program. Even without a
Blaine Amendment, there is a variety in how the states have approached
educational choice programs. Three states—Connecticut, New Jersey, and
West Virginia—do not have these programs despite not having the extra
constitutional hurdles to contend with. Alternatively, the ten other states
have current educational choice programs, but within those states there is

125. Id. at 1184.
126. Id. at 1185.
127. See supra note 34 and accompanying text; Opinion of Justices to Senate, 514 N.E.2d 353
(Mass. 1987); Traverse City Sch. Dist. v. Att’y Gen., 185 N.W.2d 9, 29–31 (Mich. 1971).
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a varying number of programs. For instance, Ohio128 and Louisiana129 have
multiple programs, while other states, like Arkansas,130 Maryland,131 and
Vermont132 have only one each.
B. Blaine Amendments After Espinoza
One question that remains for state legislators after Espinoza is the
power a Blaine Amendment now has to restrict the funding of religious
schools.133 While the Espinoza decision did not explicitly repeal
Montana’s Blaine Amendment or declare it unconstitutional, the decision
was clear that using a Blaine Amendment to discriminate against religion
and religious schools “is ‘odious to our Constitution’ and ‘cannot
stand.’”134 Espinoza outlined how a Blaine Amendment must not be used
to stop or limit an educational funding program. First, a Blaine
Amendment cannot be used to “exclude religious schools . . . solely on
religious status,” meaning a program must be neutral with respect to
religion.135 Second, a Blaine Amendment cannot put schools or families in
a position where they must “divorce [themselves] from any religious
control or affiliation” to receive a public benefit.136 Even “indirect
coercion” with the Blaine Amendment is against the Free Exercise
Clause.137 The Espinoza Court stated that using a Blaine Amendment in
these ways severely limits religious freedom for both religious schools and
those families because they are cut off “from otherwise available benefits
if they choose a religious private school rather than a secular one.”138
128. Income-Based Scholarship Program, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3310.032 (West 2021); Jon
Peterson Special Needs Scholarship Program, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3310.51 to 64 (West 2021);
Educational Choice Scholarship Program, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3310.01 to 17 (West 2013);
Autism Scholarship Program, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3310.41 to 43 (West 2021); Cleveland
Scholarship Program, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3313.974 to 979 (West 2021).
129. School Choice Program for Certain Students with Exceptionalities, LA. STAT. ANN. §
17:4031; Louisiana Scholarship Program, LA. STAT. ANN.17:4011 to 4025; Tuition Donation Credit
Program, LA. STAT. ANN. 47:6301; Elementary and Secondary School Tuition Deduction, LA. STAT.
ANN.47:293(9)(a)(xiv) and 297.10.
130. Succeed Scholarship Program, ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 6-41-901 to 907 (2021).
131. Broadening Options and Opportunities for Students Today Program, Fiscal 2020 Budget
Bill § R00A03.04.
132. Town Tuitioning Program, VT. STAT. ANN. 16 § 821–36 (2012).
133. See Hiner, supra note 108; Green, supra note 108.
134. Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2263 (2020) (quoting Trinity
Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2025 (2017)).
135. Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2256.
136. Id.
137. Id. (quoting Trinity Lutheran, 137 U.S. at 2015).
138. Id. at 2261.
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Because of these changes to the power of Blaine Amendments,
Espinoza has cleared out many legal and constitutional obstacles that stood
in the way of educational choice programs.139 Consequently, state
legislators should examine these programs and how they could be
implemented in their state. State legislators should then begin to establish
these programs which provide needed funds to students so they can have
access to the education that they need and deserve. The next Part outlines
what types of programs are available and why state legislators should work
to enact those programs, especially in response to the COVID-19
pandemic.

IV. D IFFERENT E DUCATIONAL F UNDING P ROGRAMS
There are four different education funding programs that are most
commonly used by different states: voucher programs, tax-credit
scholarships, individual tax credits, and education savings accounts. In
their efforts to reevaluate their understanding of these issues, state
legislators should understand these programs and how they are used in
other states. This Part will go through these different programs, describing
what they are and how they are used.
A. Voucher Programs
Voucher programs are generally seen as the “most highly profiled
educational reform being considered today.”140 With twenty-nine voucher
programs in sixteen states, Washington D.C., and Puerto Rico, voucher
programs are the most common type of school funding in the country.141
Voucher programs are often described as coupons for education. An
example is the program that was challenged in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris.
The Cleveland Scholarship Program142 was designed to “provide for a

139. “As a result of Espinoza, nearly every state is now free to enact programs that will empower
parents to choose the educational environment that works best for their own children, whether those
options are public, private or religious . . . . [T]his momentous decision clears the way for robust
educational choice programs with the ability to spur the creation of a greater number of educational
opportunities for students.” John Kramer, IJ Releases New Educational Choice Guide to State
Constitutions After Espinoza, INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE (July 7, 2020), https://ij.org/press-release/ijreleases-new-educational-choice-guide-to-state-constitutions-after-espinoza/.
140. Toby J. Heytens, School Choice and State Constitutions, 86 VA. L.R. 117, 119 (2000).
141. For a list of the voucher programs currently enacted see School Choice: School Choice in
America Dashboard, EDCHOICE, https://www.edchoice.org/school-choice/types-of-school-choice/
what-are-school-vouchers-2/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2022).
142. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3313.974–979.
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number of students . . . to attend alternative schools.”143 In this program,
students who are geographically assigned to a failing school district
requiring supervision by the state may receive a voucher for money that
can be used at an accredited school, whether that be a public or private
school, including a religious one.144 Priority is given to students who need
financial assistance.145 In this program, the money goes directly from the
state to the students’ parents who then pay the money to the school.146
While these programs have resulted in extensive litigation, Zelman
and Espinoza work together to hold that these programs are constitutional
and permitted in most states.147 Because of this, these programs are a good
option for state legislators to consider.
B. Tax-Credit Scholarships
Currently, there are twenty-six different tax-credit scholarship
programs in twenty-one states, making these programs the second most
common education choice program in the country.148 These programs
developed as state legislators saw them as the best option to comply with
their state’s Blaine Amendment pre-Espinoza when voucher programs
were not allowed.149
A tax-credit scholarship program was the program at issue in
Espinoza.150 The Montana program151 was enacted in 2015 to “provide
parental and student choice in education with private donations through
tax replacement programs.”152 To receive a tax credit, a person or
organization donates money to an approved Student Scholarship
Organization, which in turn uses the money to help students pay for their
143. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.975(A).
144. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.975.
145. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.977(A)(1).
146. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.979.
147. Both Massachusetts and Michigan, however, would still not be able to have programs like
this in their state because of their strict Blaine Amendments. See supra notes 34, 127 and
accompanying discussion. A few other states would possibly have a hard time enacting voucher
programs in their state despite Espinoza. For instance, Kentucky’s Constitution requires that for a
publicly funded educational financing program to be approved it must be submitted and approved by
the voters of the state. See KY. CONST. § 184.
148. For a list of the tax-credit scholarship programs currently enacted see School Choice:
School Choice in America Dashboard, EDCHOICE, https://www.edchoice.org/school-choice/types-ofschool-choice/tax-credit-scholarship/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2022).
149. See generally Boyer, supra note 13 at 122.
150. Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020). See also discussion supra
Section II.C.4.
151. MONT. CODE ANN. §§15-30-3101 to 3114 (2019).
152. MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-30-3101 (2019).
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tuition at their chosen “qualified education provider.”153 The money is paid
directly from the Scholarship Organization to the schools, meaning no
money goes directly from the state to the parents or to the school.154
After the Espinoza decision, using these programs to provide funding
to schools, especially when those schools are religious, is constitutional
even if the state has a Blaine Amendment.155 State legislators should
therefore consider these programs for their state to give students and
families the educational choice opportunities they need.
C. Individual Tax Credit Program
The third type of program, Individual Tax Credit Programs, are less
common but have been in place for some time. Currently, there are eleven
programs in nine states.156
An example of this type of program is the Minnesota K-12 Education
Deduction and Credit program that was enacted in 1955.157 In this
program, a parent receives state income tax credit on any K–12 educationrelated expenses.158 These expenses, including tuition, could be for either
a private, including religious, or public school.159 After being in place for
decades, this program was eventually litigated for violating the
Establishment Clause.160 The case made it to the federal Supreme Court
which held that the program was neutral to religion and provided support
to the families, not the schools directly and so was constitutional.161 As a
result, these programs are constitutionally allowed, regardless of whether
there is a Blaine Amendment or not, making them valuable tools that state
legislators should consider for their state.

153. MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-30-3104 (2019).
154. Id.
155. See Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2262.
156. For a list of the individual tax-credit programs currently enacted see EdChoice, School
Choice: School Choice in America Dashboard, EDCHOICE, https://www.edchoice.org/schoolchoice/types-of-school-choice/how-do-k-12-education-tax-credits-deductions-work/ (last visited
Mar. 15, 2022).
157. MINN. STAT. § 290.0674; See also Nina Manzi & Joel Michael, Income Tax Deductions
and Credits for Public and Nonpublic Education in Minnesota, MINN. HOUSE RSCH. DEP’T (June
2017) https://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/pubs/educcred.pdf.
158. MINN. STAT. § 290.0674 Subdivision 1 (1) to (4).
159. MINN. STAT. § 290.0674 Subdivision 1 (1) to (2).
160. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 391–92 (1983).
161. Id. at 399–400.
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D. Educational Savings Account
The newest type of educational funding program is the educational
savings account. Currently, there are nine of these programs in eight
states.162
The first of these programs, enacted in Arizona in 2012, is the Arizona
Empowerment Scholarship Account.163 The program’s purpose is to
“provide options for the education of students in [Arizona].”164 In this
program qualifying students apply for and receive money in their
scholarship fund to be used for tuition or other educational fees at any
qualified school, which could be public, private (including religious), or
home schools.165 This program is narrower than others because not every
interested student can receive funds. Only students who fit certain
qualifications, such as having a disability, attending a D or F rated public
school, and others, may receive the money.166 Despite these limitations,
this program gives students who need extra educational help more options
to receive the help they need. The program, however, has faced resistance
from parents and other educational groups, including a state-wide vote
rejecting a proposed expansion to the program.167
While these school choice programs are still relatively untested in the
courts, state legislators should still consider them for their states because,
based on the Espinoza decision and other precedent, any constitutional
arguments that could previously be used against them would no longer be
persuasive.

V. B ENEFITS OF S CHOOL C HOICE AND R ELIGIOUS P RIVATE
S CHOOLS
While this Comment has focused on the legal and constitutional
reasons why school choice and the funding of religious schools is now
appropriate, it is important to note that the previous legal and
162. For a list of education savings account programs currently enacted see EdChoice, School
Choice: School Choice in America Dashboard, EDCHOICE, https://www.edchoice.org/schoolchoice/types-of-school-choice/education-savings-account/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2022).
163. ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 15-2401 to 2404 (LexisNexis 2021).
164. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 15-2402(A) (LexisNexis 2021).
165. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 15-2402(B)(4) (LexisNexis 2021).
166. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 15-2401(7) (LexisNexis 2021).
167. See Rob O’Dell & Yvonne Wingett Sanchez, Group Will Ask Arizona Voters to Ban
Expansion of State’s School Voucher Program, AZCENTRAL (Feb. 26, 2020, 11:28 AM),
https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/arizona-education/2020/02/26/save-our-schoolsarizona-ask-voters-ban-expansion-empowerment-scholarship-account-esa-program/4862496002/.
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constitutional arguments against school choice are not the only arguments
against it. There are multiple policy arguments against school choice and
religious funding of school choice.168 But there are also valid policy
arguments for why school choice and funding of religious schools should
be instituted. This Part, while not exhaustive or extremely in depth,
provides state legislators with an outline of benefits that school choice and
religious private schools provide to students, schools, and communities.
A. Benefits for Students
Every student is different in his or her personality, living and family
situation, and learning style. While perhaps an obvious statement, this fact
plays a key role in education. Because of this, students have diverging
needs, talents, challenges, and goals that teachers and schools are expected
to meet.169 School choice options, such as public schools, charter schools,
magnet schools, and private schools, give parents and their children the
opportunity to choose the school that works best for the individual child
to give them the best education possible. This is especially true for students
who struggle with a physical, mental, or learning disability and who might
not have their needs met by a public school.170
Religious private schools also provide benefits for students. While
these schools provide a secular education, they also provide a religious
education that is deeply important to many parents and their children. Such
religious needs are met by private religious schools that encourage the
growth and development of their students.171
Additionally, even if the motive for attending these schools is not
religious in nature, religious schools are a good and important option for
some of “the most vulnerable students” to receive “a high quality
education.”172 Studies have shown that “Catholic school students—

168. See supra note 15.
169. See, e.g., Holli M. Levy, Meeting the Needs of all Students Through Differentiated
Instruction: Helping Every Child Reach and Exceed Standards, 81 CLEARING HOUSE 161 (2008).
170. While more school choice options can ensure that there are better schools which are more
equipped to help students with all types of disabilities, because of the added legal issues that are
involved with students with disabilities, there are a different set of issues that need to be considered
when schools, parents, and students are working together to help these students. See generally Laura
F. Rothstein, School Choice and Students with Disabilities, in SCHOOL CHOICE AND SOCIAL
CONTROVERSY: POLITICS, POLICY, AND LAW 332 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Frank R. Kemerer eds.,
1999).
171. Domanico & Kenney, supra note 5.
172. Margaret F. Brinig & Nicole Stelle Garnett, Catholic Schools, Urban Neighborhoods, and
Education Reform, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 887, 901 (2010) [hereinafter Catholic Schools]; See also
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especially poor, minority students—tend to outperform their public school
counterparts.”173 “The best religious schools have a vision of the worth of
each human life that guides their response to these differences, allowing
them to hold children to high standards while also affirming their dignity
and unique gifts.”174 Religious private schools can provide a more
equitable education for those students who need extra care, which is
important to helping those students succeed.
B. Benefits for Schools
It is not uncommon for school choice programs to develop in areas
where the public school system is underperforming. The voucher school
program in Zelman, for example, was enacted in response to Cleveland’s
failing public school system.175
Not only is this important because it gives those students a chance for
success and education when the public school system cannot provide that
for the students, but the different school choice options can provide
“healthy competition among schools.”176 Based on economic theory,
school choice allows for “students to allocate their public education funds
as their parents see fit, including by spending these public funds in a
private school because the inject of competition would improve overall
academic performance.”177 Where there are no other options for schooling,
the public school system can be seen as a “monopoly” that is resistant to
change and unable to allow competition to initiate change within the
system.178 If more schools and options are given to parents and children,
then competition and specialization increases forcing schools to improve
to better serve the students.179 While this improvement process could be
slow, there are still immediate benefits to the public school system when
families have access to the school option they feel like is the best for their
students. As students can more freely leave the public schools, a burden
will be taken off the teachers, counselors, and administrators in those

Nicole Stelle Garnett, Are Charters Enough Choice? School Choice and the Future of Catholic
Schools, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1891, 1908 (2012) [hereinafter Are Charters Enough].
173. Are Charters Enough, supra note 172, at 1907.
174. Domanico & Kenney, supra note 5.
175. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 644 (2002).
176. Boyer, supra note 13, at 120.
177. Are Charters Enough, supra note 172, at 1904.
178. JOHN MERRIFIELD, SCHOOL CHOICE: TRUE AND FALSE 3–11 (2002).
179. Id. at 59.
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public schools, and they can focus their attention on the students who
remain.
Some argue that when public funds are given to private schools, it
takes money away from the public schools, which causes a detrimental
effect on the public school system.180 But it is important to note that there
are some states that have clauses within their constitution that say that
educational choice programs cannot use the money that is already
allocated for public schools. Meaning, these programs are simply adding
money into the market, rather than taking it from a place that needs it.181
Whether the funding for religious schools comes from the public school
system or elsewhere, these religious schools can improve the status and
performance of the overall school system.
C. Benefits for Communities
The availability of different school options has a beneficial impact on
the community of which they are a part. One benefit is an increase in the
parental network and social capital that happens in a community from
those schools. In a strictly public-school system, parents and students
mainly interact with the other parents and students in the same
geographical area, which tend to be people of the same socioeconomic and
racial backgrounds. But as students are allowed to attend other schools,
the students and parents have exposure to others and can build
relationships and learn from more people than a strict public school system
allows.182
Religious schools, however, provide an even greater impact on the
communities in which they serve. In the Project on Human Development
in Chicago Neighborhoods study, researchers worked to identify the
impact that closures of Catholic schools had on Chicago neighborhoods.183
The conclusion of the study found that “a [Catholic] school closing in a
neighborhood is strongly predictive of increased levels of disorder and
suppressed levels of social cohesion and collective efficacy” within the
community where the school once was.184 The results of the study185
180. JAMES G. DWYER, VOUCHERS WITHIN REASON: A CHILD-CENTERED APPROACH TO
EDUCATION REFORM 78–79 (2002).
181. See e.g., TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 5(c); ARK. CONST. art. XIV, § 2; DEL. CONST. art X, § 4.
182. Catholic Schools, supra note 172, at 947–49.
183. Id. at 902.
184. Id. at 910.
185. See id. at 910–28 (explaining that the study’s findings tell us about the impact that religious
schools have on urban neighborhoods).
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indicate “that Catholic schools are important, stabilizing forces in urban
neighborhoods” and when those schools shut down the community is “less
socially cohesive” and “more disorderly.”186
Ultimately, different school choice options are beneficial to more than
just the students and the schools themselves. There is a quantifiable
difference felt in the community when private religious schools are
available to students.
While this Part has not been comprehensive, it is important that state
legislators have a basic understanding of the benefits that school choice
and school funding programs provide to students, schools, and
communities. This understanding will allow them to have a greater
motivation to reconsider their understanding of these issues in light of the
recent legal and constitutional developments.

VI. S TATE LEGISLATORS S HOULD R EEVALUATE THEIR P REVIOUS
S TANCE ON S CHOOL C HOICE AND S CHOOL F UNDING P ROGRAMS IN
A P OST -COVID W ORLD
One study reports that after the first full school year during the
COVID-19 pandemic in the United States, 144 private schools closed their
doors for good.187 Out of those schools, all but seventeen were religiously
affiliated.188 It is estimated that over 22,000 students were affected by the
closures and lost access to the school they felt was the appropriate fit for
their education.189 Other reports have been more dire in the number of
private religious schools that have closed.190
State legislators and others who are tirelessly working to promote
better schools and give more educational opportunities to all students
should see these closures as devastating, especially in light of the already
existing trend of private school closures that has occurred for decades.191
There is a strong government and public interest to improve schools and
education.192 A society will not be able to continue to thrive if those who
are coming up to take the place of the leaders are not trained and able to
186. Id. at 928.
187. Cato’s Center for Educational Freedom, COVID-19 Permanent Private School Closures,
CATO INSTITUTE (July 2021), https://www.cato.org/covid-19-permanent-private-closures.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. See supra notes 2–5 and accompanying text.
191. Catholic Schools, supra note 172, at 889.
192. Expanding Educational Opportunity Through School Choice: Hearing Before the
Committee on Education and the Workforce, 114th Cong. 2 (2016) (statement of Hon. John Kline,
Chairman, Committee on Education and the Workforce).
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do so. And that training takes place in schools of all types. As has been
mentioned in this Comment, there are many benefits that come from
school choice options. Specifically, this Comment has outlined some of
the ways that religious private schools provide value to students, to school
systems, and to communities. If religious schools are permanently closed,
then those benefits will permanently be gone.
This underlying motivation for improving schools should be bolstered
by the recent Espinoza decision, which has broken down the constitutional
and legal roadblocks that were previously in place to stop school choice
programs. The religion clauses of the Federal Constitution and state Blaine
Amendments have been used to legally block these programs or dissuade
state legislators from trying to implement them. But throughout the years
these arguments have lost validity and persuasiveness as the Supreme
Court’s understanding of these issues has changed. The latest step in
clearing out these roadblocks took place in Espinoza, where the Court has
outlined how these programs can be implemented and used in different
states, even if there is a Blaine Amendment. Now, after this development,
there are no legitimate legal or constitutional arguments against these
types of programs.
This is a new opportunity for state legislators that they should not pass
up. State legislators have the chance to reconsider their understanding of
these programs and how they can be used to help the education system in
their states. Voucher programs, tax credit systems, educational savings
accounts are all valuable options to help provide better school options to
students, which will in turn give religious schools the money and ability
to stay open. State legislatures must take the time to look at these programs
and work to implement them into their state’s education system as needed.
These programs will allow religious private schools to get the help they
need to recover after the pandemic and help the overall educational system
within a state become stronger. This will ultimately allow for all students
to be better educated, which is a goal that we all should be striving for.

VII. C ONCLUSION
The Supreme Court ruling in Espinoza v. Montana Department of
Revenue has taken away the constitutional hurdles that have prevented
many states from implementing educational choice programs. Now that
these hurdles have been taken away, state legislators can establish these
programs in their states. They should consider these programs and the
needs of their state, especially during and post-COVID-19 pandemic, and
implement them as needed. This will be beneficial for students now and in
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the future. These programs have the potential to help many struggling
religious private schools stay open past the COVID-19 pandemic. And
while the problems that have been created will not easily or quickly be
solved, the different educational choice programs that have been outlined
in this Comment should be considered as a way to ease the problems that
are in place. A wide variety of voucher, tax-credit, and educational
scholarship account programs should be implemented and made available
to all students. These programs will then allow more benefits to be
received by the students themselves, the educational system, and
communities that the schools serve.
Leah Blake
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